

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE:

Wednesday, March 5, 1975

OSD review completed.

TIME:

State Dept. review
completed

7:34 a.m. to 8:30 a.m.

PLACE:

Cabinet Room, The White House

SUBJECT:

SALT Compliance

NSC Review Completed

Principals

The President

The Vice President

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen George S. Brown

Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Dr. Fred Ikle

Director of Central Intelligence William Colby

NSA review completed

JCS review completed.

Other Attendees

State:

Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll

Defense:

Deputy Secretary William Clements

CIA:

Mr. Carl Duckett

White House:

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to
the President

NSC:

Brent Scowcroft
Jan M. Lodal

MORI/CDF per C05135248

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President Ford: Good Morning. There are four or five issues on compliance with the SALT I Agreements, questions we have raised with the Soviets -- Henry, do you want to sum up where the problem is -- maybe Carl and Bill could add to it also --

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, Mr. President -- I would like to begin by bringing you up-to-date on the status of the Geneva Talks, and then we can turn to compliance. The Soviets tabled a draft treaty at the first SALT meeting in Geneva. On a number of issues, they differed with our views.

On MIRV Verification, they have said that our existing national technical means of verification are adequate. We have put forth several counting rules for distinguishing MIRV launchers -- the ones we went through at the last NSC meeting. We have now put these in a protocol to our own draft treaty, but we have left it open for them to tell us what characteristics of their systems our national technical means can use to distinguish MIRVs. If they can tell us, we will bring the proposal here to you.

There is the expected disagreement over cruise versus ballistic missiles. We have not yet had an opportunity to explore our compromise of banning cruise missiles on everything except bombers.

The Soviets' draft also contained two provisions that went beyond the Vladivostok Agreement. One of these is a limit of 240 on new types of SLBMs, including our Trident. At your instruction, I pointed out to Gromyko that we would not negotiate on items inconsistent with Vladivostok. They have not yet dropped it, but he said they would consider this point carefully.

We will table a draft treaty very shortly, if we have not already done so.

Mr. Graybeal: We plan to table it today.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we will table a draft treaty today. In summary, the differences that exist are manageable if the Soviets really want an agreement, or they can be used to stall if they don't want an agreement. Unless they can satisfy us that our national technical means can distinguish their MIRVs, we will not

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accept their approach. Of course, their position has one advantage, in that it indicates they will not press us on the distinctions between Minuteman II and Minuteman III.

In short, it is too early to tell how it will come out.

On compliance, Senator Jackson has been holding hearings on the issues of compliance. Bill testified last week, and I think Jim is scheduled sometime this week.

Secretary Schlesinger: George and I plan to go up sometime tomorrow.

Secretary Kissinger: At least if Jackson pulls out JCS documents, George will know what he is talking about! (Laughter)

Secretary Schlesinger: That is not certain!

Secretary Kissinger: The last time I went up there, Jackson pulled out some JCS documents which I had never seen, and wouldn't show them to me, but he wanted me to confirm them. (Laughter)

Jackson is clearly trying to build a case against the Vladivostok Agreement by pointing to loopholes and ambiguities in the first agreement, so these can be used as an issue on Vladivostok.

There are four issues which we should discuss --

- The volume of the SS-19.
- Possible testing of an SA-5 air defense radar in an ABM mode.
- The III-X command and control silos.
- Concealment and deception at missile test and production facilities.

Secretary Schlesinger: Isn't this a political loser for Jackson? Isn't he just losing ground by attacking Vladivostok?

President Ford: I think he is.

Secretary Kissinger: I would have thought so.

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President Ford: He has quieted down some from his first blast, but with these hearings, perhaps he is trying to build a new case so that he can be ready when the agreement is finished.

Secretary Schlesinger: He has been very inconsistent. He is trying to run with both the hounds and the hares.

President Ford: Other politicians have tried that also -- ask Rumsfeld about it -- he is a master! (Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: On the substance, I agree with Jim -- he is inconsistent. He said the SALT I numbers were too low, and the SALT II numbers too high. Perhaps that's why he is now focusing on verification problems, so he can call the whole thing no good.

Secretary Schlesinger: Our position has to be clear on this -- there are verification problems, but we can handle them. We are not in some Utopia --

Secretary Kissinger: Our ultimate position should be consistent with the position you outlined. But first, I think we should go through the specific issues.

The first issue is the SS-19. Throughout SALT I, a major goal of the US was to limit Soviet deployment of heavy ICBMs. The interim agreement froze the number of launchers for heavy ICBMs at 308. However, the two sides never reached agreement on what constituted a heavy ICBM.

There was some interesting side-play on this. At one point during the negotiations in Moscow, Brezhnev agreed to no increase in silo dimensions. The next day, Smirnov pulled back on this. 25X1

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Consequently, the US issued a unilateral statement which said that the US would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the light ICBM operational to be heavy ICBM. But we never explained exactly what we meant by "significantly". The Soviets flatly rejected the unilateral statement.

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
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Later, at one point Laird answered in writing a question from Jackson by saying that the Soviets would be permitted to increase the volume of their light missiles only up to about 30%, but again, this is not part of the formal record, except as a unilateral statement on our part.

Whatever the state of play is now with respect to the 19, one of our objectives in SALT II is to draw a limit on the size of the missile at the 18, so there won't be questions like this in the future.

Bill, you might wish to explain what we know about the 18.



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